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Governance Model and Rents Allocation in Asymmetrical Power 
Relations: The Case of Notebook Computer Industry 
Xiong Ying, Ma Hai-yan  
School of Economics and Management, China University of Geosciences, P.R.China 
 
Abstract: International subcontracting relationships are often characterized by considerable power asymmetries. The actors 
in global value chain obtained different profits. Different governance dominant modes reflect different roles of countries and 
enterprises played in the global value chains and result in different industrial international competitiveness in the end 
Through a relation model of upstream and downstream nodes and a case study of notebook computer industry, the paper 
identified the status of actors and the market structures in different value nodes influences the rents distribution among 
global value chains. The leader firms in the global value chains that possess status advantages and market power account for 
income growing gap between developed and developing countries. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
International outsourcing has been identified as a strategic means for U.S. and European-based firms to 
select world-class suppliers and effectively minimize costs (Kaufman, Wood, & Theyel, 2000; Mol, Pauwels, 
Matthyssens, & Quintens, 2004). Lots of small and middle sized firms in Pacific Rim countries have been 
swarming into the supplying army, which obviously enhance the degree of competition among manufactures. As 
a result, the formation of Global value chain results in geographically and inter-organizationally separation of 
organizational activities and causes boundary of corporations and industries transcending national scope [1] . 
International division of labor based on value chains is a new outcome of international division of labor and has 
led to massive increases in international trade and investment that extend industries beyond national borders. 
The power of the large lead firms has been growing fast as they capture more and more of the global market 
share and exploit economies of scale at unprecedented levels. International subcontracting relationships are 
often characterized by considerable power asymmetries. “Governance” is applied in the research literature of 
different transaction to describe authority to control, influence and configure the modes and rules of interactions 
(Balgobin, 2008).Compared to the governance of individual business; governance in the backdrop of global 
value chains seems even more complex.  
In the Prior literature on this topic, the relation between governance model and rents allocation has 
attracted great attention, but for what and how does the governance model influence the rents allocation in 
asymmetrical Power Relations needs more empirical support.   
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
2.1 Governance model: from single dimension to multi-dimensions 
The rules that participants should obey are marked by the leader of the industry in the Value-Chains, not 
decided by the free market, and in this way the Value-Chains-Governance is put forward. Gereffi (1994) divided 
it into two types: producer-driven" value chains and buyer-driven value chains. Sterne (2002) come up with the 
national model of the governance of the value chains which is based on the research of Lee’s and that is 
Japanese model, Germany model, Italian model, and American model. This model can vary from three kinds: 
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leadership (Japan and Korea), relational (German and Italy), modular (America). Based on the production 
network theory of Stern and Powell, Gereffi, etc. (2003), presented a relatively complete system of strict 
framework, with the combination of the value chains theory, transaction cost economics, technological 
capability and enterprise learning theory. They summed up five typical governance model of notebook computer, 
drawn the extent of the asymmetry between the external coordination and the rights, among the value chains 
subjects ,by a low to high order of priority for the market type, modular type, relational type,captive and 
hierarchy type.  
In the backdrop of globalization, massive governance deficit has appeared (Gereffi and Mayer, 2007; Coe 
and Hess, 2008). Gereffi et al. studied the matter of industrial governance, proposing five types for the 
governance of global value chains[2] .Different from the single dimension of industrial governance in his study, 
Liu Lingqing, Tan Liwen and Ma Haiyan(2011) constructs the industrial two-dimensional governance model of 
the developing countries in the context of global value chain based on the interaction between industry 
governance and market governance, and also presents five typical governance modes，such as free to market 
dominant mode，public governance dominant mode, industrial governance dominant mode，joint governance 
dominant mode and network governance dominant mode. Different governance dominant modes reflect 
different roles of countries and enterprises played in the global value chains and result in different industrial 
international competitiveness in the end [3]． 
 
2.2 Relation rents and network rents 
Global value chain in fact is an intricate production network consisting of plenty interacted firms, urging the 
involved actors to realize that it is nonsensical to be an effective sole island in an ineffective ocean without an 
integrated valid process restructure; on the other hand, it is crucial to keep horizontal cooperation aiming to 
retain competitive advantage, specifically, small and middle sized firms reduce risk and cost by collaborated 
marketing and procurement, shared service etc. Therefore Lorenzoni & Lipparini(1999)advanced，firms` 
competitive advantage can be gained through effective relations management. Rents embedded in corporation 
group in global value chain can be summarized into relational rent and network rent.  
Dyer & Singh(1998)，Kale, Singh & Perlmutter (2000) figured that internal economic factor like 
incentive to complementary resource, external environmental factor such as resource scarcity and other 
non-economic factor  are three kinds of motive and determinants for collaborated relationship among 
organizations. Relational rent can be obtained then further transforming into organizational competitive 
advantage through leveraging of inter-organizational relation [4]. Luomin&Luo Hongling（2007）pointed out 
that the most evident character of relational rent is relationship, not only super profit [5]. Special cooperate 
relationship after long term cooperation between organizations is crucial resource to obtain competitive 
advantage. The crucial resource maybe span firm boundary and embed to inter-firm routine and procedure 
which then give rise to relational rent. Additionally, long term cooperation produces intricate 
interconnectedness and creates source privates and target scarcity which will establish imitation obstacle to 
relational rent. Rational rent emphasizing dyadic relationship greatly enhances possibility for organization 
to get super rents. The dyadic view is unlike the cognition from transaction cost theory and resource-based 
view on rational rents in nature. Rent is particular for manufacture in resource-based view and is unique in 
trade from transaction cost view, which both embraces a common hypothesis that whatever the rent source 
is, manufactures` collaborated profit will be affected. Relational rents stresses its analyzing unit is dyadic 
relationship and believes specific allied relationship after a long term symbiosis is a crucial resource for 
competitive advantage. This key resource may transcend firm boundary and embed into routine and 
convention in corporations then create relational rent. Additionally, the interconnectedness can build up 
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source proprietary and become imitation barrier [5]. 
There are obvious differences between fellowship in GVC and in fair trade market. Fellowship in fair 
trade market is feature with low specific asset investment, low information exchange, separated technical 
function system, low transact cost and lowest investment in governance mechanism under which situation 
buyer can change transact fellow with low punishment and in nature, relation between trade two sides is 
competitive. GVC calls for great collaboration among laces. Establishing close relationship among Firms 
inter-chain are not only driven by transaction, but also inspired by technology collaboration, co-purchase, 
information sharing etc. Relation between firms needs coordination besides competition. Therefore, 
fellowship is capable of creating relational rent and competitive advantage.  
When one-to-one dyadic relationship among individuals develops into Tribal relationship between 
groups, several social relations in network organization have seen a new perspective to study, which is 
network rent. Called network rent is a positive surplus after general profit created by all members in 
network organization having counterbalanced their sum of single profit. In transaction cost theory , trade 
can be harmonized by three kind government system, called  market, hierarchy and mix pattern and 
network governance theory should be regarded one kind social system, in which trust mechanism, 
reputation mechanism and collected trade mechanism will reduce transaction cost[6]. Network is not only 
beneficial to reduce transaction cost, but also facilitate to create rents [7]. Besides relational rents, network 
is regarded as locus of innovation. Actors in network organization with various backgrounds and 
capabilities are capable to expand technical options through upgrading knowledge aggregation[8]. 
Concluding present paper, we can find that effect created by network rent mainly shows in complementary 
effect in network resource, exterior effect in knowledge learning and innovation, external scale effect and 
amplification effect of marketing control power [9]. 
Therefore, taking transaction cost saving in mind, network organization possess production and 
innovation function non-substitute by market or individual firm. This is unique characters of network 
organization break out individual limited in abilities. Industry cluster which is a best embodiment for 
network rent in GVC. Industry cluster is one important form of global distribution of GVC whose nature is 
a kind of network form. Enright(2001) regards firms in cluster can create super profit through 
collaboration and can perform better than firms outside cluster. Competitive advantage of cluster is 
presented by collective efficiency, specifically expressed in external economics, combined actions and 
system effect. 
 
3. MODEL ANALYSIS: GOVERNANCE MODEL AND RENTS DISTRIBUTION  
Network, as strategic resource, can bring rents to firms which are key resource for firm’s competitive 
advantage. A relative question comes up naturally: how is rent allocated? Only for relational rent, many 
empirical study prove that it not average allocation between collaborated firms. Then, how to get more 
percentage in rent allocation? 
The paper divides product into the first order and second order according to Lu Feng (2004). Product 
of the first order refers to the product can bring certain consumer and product function into play 
independently [10]. Product of the second order, having no independent consumption and production, can be 
specific components itself of after transformation through assembling or processing procedure. Actors in 
global value chain have being portrait collaboration of upstream and downstream industry taches. The 
collaboration between upstream and downstream enterprises can be realized through product of the second 
order, which become the determinants of the coordinated relation. 
Multinational corporations of developed countries have played critical roles in global value chain. To 
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simplify our model, we suppose that production divided into upstream and downstream stages and 
upstream enterprise provides the second product which then is affected by market structure of both two 
streams. 
Combined model of Hay and Morris (1991), we assumed upstream enterprise product and sale a sort 
of the second order product S, an input of production process of downstream enterprise. Downstream 
enterprise yield product of the first order X. one unit of the two order product are corresponding to each 
other, i.e. a unit S produce one unit X. There are m enterprises of the first order product and n enterprises 
of the second order product. The outputs are homogeneity without cahoots [11]. 
For product of the first order in downstream market, anti-demand function is ( )，Ｑfp =χ  χqm×=Ｑ , 
χq shows quantity of every enterprise producing the first order product. χc is variable cost excluding the 
second order product; χＦ is fixed cost; so profit function of downstream enterprises is  
χχχχχχχπ Ｆ−−−= qcqpqp s                   （1） 
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Order χε  as demand flexibility of the first order product and aggregate profit optimization condition 
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After settled, causing demand curve from the first order function to the second product S is: 
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In the product of second order, anti-demand function is ( )Ｑfps = , sqn×=Ｑ , sq is the quantity of 
every enterprise of the second order product. sc  is variable cost and sＦ is fixed cost input by upstream 
enterprises; so profit function of upstream enterprises is  
( ) ssssss qcqcqm ＦＭＲ −−−= χχπ                  （5） 
According to the first derivative condition of profit optimization for the second order product, when 
profit is optimized 













ＭＲ                    （6） 
Through aggregating profit optimization condition of every product of the second product enterprises, 
equilibrium condition of the second order product market can be found: 









                （7） 
( )nsＭＭＲ is marginal curve of anti-demand function of the first order product. The second order 
product anti-demand function of the second order enterprises is ( ) ( ) χχ cms −=ＭＲＱＰ ,So the marginal income 
function of the second order enterprises is ( ) ss cn −ＭＭＲ , when MR=MC, i.e. 
( ) ss ccn =− χＭＭＲ                             （8） 
From above, quantity Q* and equilibrium price ps* of the second product can be achieved. In addition, 
the marginal cost of first order product in downstream is ps*+cx. According to the first derivative 
condition of profit optimization MR=MC, so, 
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( ) χχ cpm s += ∗ＭＲ                          （9） 
The quantity Q* and equilibrium price 
∗
sp of the second product can be obtained. 
The model showed that the smooth production process in upstream and downstream production 
depend on the demand equilibrium [12]. The profit of actors in global value chain is mainly determined by 
market structure of the two order product that is the quantity of m and n. 
Asymmetry of leader power in GVC in fact have reacted asymmetry in relational rent allocation. 
Higher in leader power, higher allocation quotient of relational rent firm will get. That is to say, asymmetry 
of leader power is one of important factor account for income growing gap between developed and 
developing countries. On the other hand, we find that GVC is dynamic and the governance kind is also 
dynamic. With improvement in standard, technology skill and supplier ability, modularization is becoming 
a mainly kind in nowadays. 
4 GOVERNANCE MODEL AND RENTS ALLOCAITON IN NOTEBOOK COMPUTER IDNUSTRY 
 
4.1 Methodology 
In this article we present an exploratory research process using a case study approach (e.g. Merriam, 
1998; Yin, 1989).We selected the notebook computer industry as the empirical base for our asymmetrical 
power relations research for several reasons. Firstly, after more than ten years of development, production 
of notebook computers has formed global co-production, the product of the international division of labor 
within the industry model. Secondly, on the whole, industry of notebook computer has significant 
characteristic of the "producer-driven" commodity chains and classical asymmetrical relations among 
actors in global value chains. 
4.2 Formation and evolvement of governance model in notebook computer industry 
Microsoft, Intel and other U.S. companies are in the center part, Microsoft's Windows operating 
system (Windows) and Intel's central processing unit (CPU) team , forming a notebook computers software 
and hardware industry standard, that has the characteristics of strong technology-intensive. Technical 
architecture standards proposed by they has become a "baton" to guide industrial development, 
Manufacturer of notebook computers components and peripherals must design products in accordance with 
these industry standards, so that Microsoft and Intel are in the center position in the coordination of the 
commodity chains network, control of raw materials and parts suppliers forwards, close contact with the 
distributor retailer backwards.In industry of notebook computer parts supply network, the key components 
such as CPU, computer chips, dynamic random access memory, etc, these high-tech products gathered in 
the United States, Japan, South Korea and China Taiwan, the general components such as motherboard, 
video card, mouse, etc produced mainly by the Chinese mainland, China Taiwan and so on. Taiwan has 
become the world’s largest manufacturer of notebook computers since 1994. In 2012, almost 65 percent of 
the notebook computers sold under the international brand were designed and manufactured by Taiwanese 
firms under OEM arrangement. 
The industry of value chains of notebook computer closer to the hybrid value chains. In industry of 
value chains of notebook computer, the most critical participants are the brand-led business and first-class 
supplier. In sales terminals, brand-led company has a strong brand and global sales network brands have a 
lot of power in the value chains governance and income distribution, a certain extent, their orders 
determine the survival and profitability of manufacturers, the value chains tends to brand-driven value 
chains; In production, the first class supplier directly accept orders from brand-led companies, R & D 
products rely advantage of their technical capabilities, and organize production using the production 
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network having been formed. Since the first class supplier technological capabilities in research and 
development, sub-suppliers needed to produce the corresponding parts ancillary products based on their 
design, form technology-driven value chains between the first class supplier and sub-suppliers. And rapid 
technological advances shortened product life cycles, requiring faster product replacement; brand-led 
companies face large time pressure in the promotion of products, which in turn requires form the 
reciprocity close relationship between the brand-led businesses and all levels of suppliers to meet market 
needs and flexible production. 
 
4.3 The status of firms, market structures and rents allocation in notebook computer industry 
In industry of notebook computer parts supply network, the key components such as CPU, computer 
chips, dynamic random access memory, etc, these high-tech products gathered in the United States, Japan, 
South Korea and China Taiwan, the general components such as motherboard, video card, mouse, etc 
produced mainly by the Chinese mainland, China Taiwan and so on (see Table 1). 
Table 1.  Notebook computer global fragmentation of Production system  
Country or Region Enterprise Major division 
United States Microsoft, Intel Control of the PC market, the main products monopolistic 
United States, Japan, China 
Taiwan Dell, HP, Toshiba, Acer, etc. Brand, marketing, channel 
China Taiwan TSMC, UMC, Inventec, Mitac, Tatung ODM / OEM manufacturing, global logistics 
Japan, Korea, China Taiwan NEC, Hitachi, Toshiba, Samsung, Hyundai, BenQ Key parts LCD, CRT, DRAM 
China, China Taiwan Lite, Delta, Hongji, should have, Fu Hua Shell, mouse, keyboard, battery, connectors 
Resouce：According to Foster etc. (2006), Zhang Ji (2006) collation 
In the production network notebook computer industry, most other manufacturers entrust China 
Taiwan contract maker producing the notebook computers, in addition to Japanese manufacturers still 
insist on producing some of notebook computers by themselves. The CM and ODM companies linked to 
the suppliers of parts and peripherals in order to meet requirements for product brands, thus becoming the 
sticking point of industry production operations. In 2012, quantity of notebook computer OEM in Taiwan 
is 94% the world's total quantity of notebook computer OEM (Shui Qing Mu Hua Research Center, 2012). 
These headquarters and R & D center of Taiwan ODM companies generally located in Taipei, in order to 
protect intellectual property and improve competitive advantage, large enterprises expand R & D 
institutions actively in Taipei, and in order to reduce costs, most of the production facilities are located in 
China Changjiang River Delta (Shanghai, Kunshan, Suzhou), many notebook computer manufacturers 
settled in Chongqing in 2010, the Chinese mainland has become the world's largest production base of 
notebook computers . 
94% of global notebook computer computers are assembled by Taiwanese vendors, mostly ODMs 






R&D Sales and Service Product design 
Conceptual design: 
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Figure 1.  Notebook computer industry value chains 
The Thirteenth Wuhan International Conference on E-Business—Innovation Management and IT Business Value                  553 
computer ODMs are from Taiwan, their production bases are located in Mainland China. China's notebook 
computer output was 244 million in 2011, of which 230 million ones were exported. In 2010, notebook 
computer manufacturers accessed to Chongqing successively. Their production bases put into production 
in 2011 when 24,073,900 notebook computers were produced in Chongqing, up 25.4-fold. Quanta 
powerfully regained the No.1 position from Compal in 2010 since Acer, the largest client of Compal, 
performed poorly in quarter 4 with grave inventory. Wistron also failed to meet the shipment objective in 
2010, Inventec invariably hovered at the low level and rejected the low-price orders of HP. Hon Hai 
persevered in developing the notebook computer contract manufacture, but it strictly controlled the 
contract scale, increasingly difficult to obtain profits. Notebook computer OEM field is characterized by 
fierce competition and the gross margin of the OEMs is usually between 3%-5%(see Table 2). 
 
Table 2.  Shipment of major notebook computer ODMs in the World, 2010-2011 (Unit: mln) 
Compan/ year 2010 2011 Major Clients 
Quanta 53.44 55.8 HP, Dell, Lenovo, Toshiba, Asus 
Compal 45.1 40.5 Acer, Dell, Lenovo, HP, Toshiba 
Wistorn 27.5 31.6 Acer, Dell, Lenovo 
Inventec 16.0 16.0 HP, Toshiba 
Hon Hai 8.0 12.0 HP, Asus 
 
Global value chains of notebook computer evolve from a single market to the global market, from the 
whole production to the production of global integration with supply chains in the mode of production, 
which not only lower costs of production, sales and other costs, also the level of service extends from 
OEM to ODM, and it provide direction for notebook computer enterprises to enhance their core 
competitiveness. 
The formation of the global value chains of notebook computer makes the international division of 
labor more and more detailed in notebook computer industry, the governance model is particularly 
important among brand owners, contract makers and suppliers. From a governance perspective, notebook 
computer enterprises that specialized division of labor will form different relationships in the value chains: 
as it often requires exchange information on the product conceptual design and product development 
between leading brand enterprises and tier one suppliers, but the information can be encoded degree is 
lower at this stage of the value chains, value chains governance is mainly relational value chains; When the 
product has been put into production through development trial, the degree of information can be encoded 
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Figure 2.  Different governance models in notebook computer industry  
554                  The Thirteenth Wuhan International Conference on E-Business—Innovation Management and IT Business Value 
3. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
Not every link of the global value chain that involves numerous firms from different countries creates value. 
The status of actors and the market structures in different value nodes influences the rents distribution among 
global value chains. Lead firms control strategic links and possess the power to coordinate and manage global 
value chain, while suppliers are led by them. Notebook computer enterprises have formed multiple governance 
relations in the value chains. With the uneven of profits distribution and rents distribution, Chinese notebook 
computer firms are in low value-added location, it has brought many predicaments to enterprise upgrading. 
Chinese notebook computer industry ranges from simple assembly components along the industry chains 
gradually, intermediate products and R&D and other more advanced stage of development. By attracting foreign 
investment, it reduces the gaps of the mainland enterprise technology capability, so that production and export 
structure has been significantly improved. But local businesses are still in the underlying network of production. 
With the rising cost of factors of production, labor cost advantage comparative to other mainland Asian or South 
American countries are also reduced, which makes upgrading the key issues whether local companies can 
growth healthily. To break the plight of industrial upgrading to obtain the benefits of joining the global value 
chains needs the support of the macro-environment and micro base guarantee. 
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